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Contracting for Complex Products  




The US Federal Government spends just under twenty percent of its budget buying 
everything from paper clips to complex weapons systems.  Effective contracting promises 
win-win exchanges: governments gain efficiency and qualities not available through in-
house production, and vendors win because the price is above their production costs.  
Markets are most likely to produce win-win outcomes when buyers and sellers can easily 
define and verify product cost, quality and quantities. We call these simple products.  
Markets for simple products tend to have large numbers of buyers and sellers who are well 
informed about each others’ offerings, can easily enter and exit the market, and can clearly 
define the terms of exchange.  In such ideal circumstances, contracts are relatively complete 
in that there are few unanticipated circumstances in which the buyers’ and sellers’ roles are 
not clearly defined.  If for some reason a buyer or seller fails to live up to her obligations, the 
transgression is quickly and easily recognized and a richly competitive market provides a 
replacement partner seeking similar terms.   
When markets fail, the win-win outcomes of contracting are replaced by lose-lose or 
win-lose outcomes where the winner’s gains are greater than the loser’s losses.  One 
source of market failure is buyer and seller uncertainty about the product in the exchange, 
what we call complex products.1  Unlike simple products, the cost, quality and quantity 
parameters of complex products can not be easily defined or verified, leaving buyers and 
sellers unable to clearly and completely define exchange terms (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001).2  
The risk is that the government is the only purchaser and once the contract is let, the vendor 
is the only viable supplier, leaving each with no easy exit from the contract, limited 
information about costs and quality, and engaging a partner relatively unconstrained by 
                                                
1 In other cases, either the buyer or seller may be more uncertain about the product.  In cases where 
the seller has an information advantage, buyers cannot discern between high- and low-quality 
products and consequently pay only the price for low-quality goods less they be caught paying high-
quality prices for low-quality goods.  The result is a lemons market (Akerloff, 1970) in which the 
presence of low-quality products destroys the market for high-quality products.  Cases where the 
buyer has an information advantage are less problematic: the buyer has every incentive to share 
information (stimulating vendor competition) and markets are efficient at distributing information.   
2 There are many sources of market failures, including incomplete property rights, transaction costs, 
information asymmetries, and barriers to market entry and exit (e.g., Mankiw, et al., 2002).  Goods 
may be non-rivalrous or non-excludable so that transferable property rights cannot be established 
and enforced without transaction costs swamping gains from trade (Weimer & Vining, 1999).  
Historical accident may inefficiently lock-in path dependent technologies such as the QWERTY 
keyboard (David, 1985).  A common thread in these cases is that the market failure is caused by the 
transaction costs stemming from limited information among participants, particularly buyers, or from 
goal incongruence between the buyers and sellers.  Complex products can be viewed as just one 





market pressures. The consequence is a collective action problem in which the buyer and 
seller have incentives to exploit contract ambiguities for their own gain at the other’s 
expense, risking mutually disadvantageous outcomes.   
In the business arena, the risk of market failure often justifies avoiding the market 
altogether, perhaps through vertically integrating production of the complex product 
(Williamson, 1991).  In the public sphere, legal mandates often require governments to 
provide goods and services where markets are prone to fail and government production is 
impractical.  Achieving public value in complex contracting requires transforming lose-lose 
conflict into win-win cooperation, a challenging though not impossible task, as the 
voluminous collective action literature suggests (e.g., Ostrom, 2000).  
Our theoretical approach suggests that contracting relationships between buyers and 
sellers are more fruitfully specified along several dimensions.  First, what is being 
exchanged in the relationship and how uncertain are the actors about the terms of exchange 
(e.g., are the products simple or complex?).  Second, what aspects of the relationship are 
formally detailed (such as in a contract) and which are left informal (as in a network)?  Third, 
how does the strategic context shape interactions between buyers (principals) and sellers 
(agents)?  Self interest leads to win-win outcomes in contracts for simple products, for 
example, while complex products can become prisoners’ dilemmas, as we show in this 
paper.  Depending on the nature of the strategic context, other forms are possible.   
In this paper, we first lay out the theoretical case for how complex contracting risks a 
collective action problem. Casting complex contracting as a prisoners’ dilemma suggests 
potential avenues for achieving win-win outcomes, but it also reveals how uncertainty 
threatens cooperation and accountability mechanisms. Second, we illustrate the analytic 
value of the complex contracting theory with the case of the Coast Guard’s controversial 
Deepwater project, a major acquisition program to upgrade and integrate its entire fleet of 
air and sea assets.  As we show in this paper, the exchange between the Coast Guard and 
the private consortium which took the lead on producing and delivering Deepwater assets 
occurred in a highly uncertain environment, with an incomplete contract with both formally 
specified and informal elements, and in a prisoners’ dilemma strategic context.   
Complex Products and Complex Contracting 
When making purchases, a buyer may be able to specify the objectives she wants to 
accomplish, but not the products and features which can accomplish them.  In some 
circumstances, a buyer may be able to specify the objectives she wants to accomplish 
through purchasing, but not the products and features which can accomplish them.  While 
complementary products can inform the buyer about product qualities, quantities and prices, 
sometimes the objectives are sufficiently unique that market signals about these products 
provide little guidance.  For complex products, the buyer has value uncertainty–she does not 
know the value of different products’ capabilities, qualities and tradeoffs among them–and 
the seller has cost uncertainty–he does not know the costs of producing the product with 
different capabilities and qualities to meet the buyer’s objectives (Hart & Moore, 2008).   
Incomplete Contracts 
Contracts specify each party’s obligations in an exchange, including the price, 
qualities, and quantities of the product.  The buyer’s obligations can include the payment 
terms and the terms under which the product is to be received (e.g. timing of delivery).  The 





combination of output specifications such as product qualities and quantities and input 
characteristics such as time and materials.3  The contract may also define each party’s 
discretion, perhaps through reference to public law for default rights and obligations (Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2006).    
Contract completeness is the degree to which the contract defines buyers and 
sellers’ rights and obligations across all future contingencies (Hart & Moore 2008; Tirole, 
1999; Bajari & Tadelis, 2001; Heinrich, 1999; Martin, 2004; O’Looney, 1998).  All contracts 
are incomplete to some degree because the future contains an infinite number of scenarios, 
not all of which can be specified in advance. At some point the costs of writing contract 
terms for all future scenarios exceed the mutual gains from the trade, and no contracting 
would occur. Because of ambiguity about how to design and build a product to meet the 
buyer’s objectives, and the associated costs faced by the seller, the two parties cannot 
specify all contract elements in advance.  Complex products lead to highly incomplete 
contracts.   
Asset Specific Investments  
There are two primary means to reduce complex products’ value and cost 
uncertainty – research and development and producing the product (i.e., learning by doing).  
Buyers can contract for both designing and/or building from sellers.  Negotiating and 
executing a contract for a complex product often requires buyer and seller to make asset 
specific investments.  Expenditures are asset specific to the extent they have no economic 
value outside the product being produced (Williamson, 2005).  For example, some research 
in the US space program produced economic value outside the contract (e.g., Tang), while 
other research produced little value outside the contract (e.g., spacesuits, at least as of 
2008).  Other asset specific investments in complex contracting include the buyer and seller 
customizing production processes to suit each others’ idiosyncrasies.  Asset specific 
investments are lost if the contract is not executed. 
Lock-In Risks 
The consequence of an incomplete contract, asset specific investments and an 
unpredictable future is the classic “lock-in” problem (Williamson, 1996).  A party becomes 
locked into a contract because it cannot redeploy its asset specific investments to other 
profitable endeavors; the other party can exploit unforeseen events and contract 
ambiguities.  For the buyer, the “lock-in” risk is that once a seller has been selected, no 
other potential sellers have made the necessary investments, and the advantaged seller 
may look to opportunistically exploit contract ambiguities perhaps by “gold plating” the 
product with costly features that increase his profits, but for the buyer add little value and 
considerable expense.  Likewise, because the seller has only one buyer for its products, the 
buyer may also opportunistically exploit contract terms for its own favor.  The buyer may 
force a seller, for example, to make changes to a product that raise costs above the 
negotiated price even though it well knows that a cheaper product would meet her needs 
                                                
3 Fixed-price contracts set compensation on the seller’s outputs while cost reimbursement contracts 
set compensation on inputs, such as time and materials.  These terms specify who generally bears 
cost risk: fixed price contracts place more of the cost risk on sellers and cost plus contracts place 





almost as well.  In these circumstances, the exploiter’s gains can be smaller than the 
exploited party’s losses.   
Absent lock-in problems, the buyer can simply replace an opportunistically behaving 
seller with a more suitable one, and a seller can likewise replace an opportunistic buyer.  
Lock-in problems coupled with incomplete contracts weaken the disciplining power of 
market forces.  Within a single complex contract, each party is likely to find itself 
simultaneously advantaged in some areas and vulnerable to exploitation in others.  Lock-in 
problems transform a contract from a market exchange to a political relationship whose 
outcomes are determined less by market forces and more by the strategic relationship 
between the buyer and seller.   
Strategy 
When performing in areas where the contract is vague, the buyer and seller’s 
behavior can be either perfunctory or consummate, using the terminology of Hart and Moore 
(2008) and Williamson (1975, p. 69).  Perfunctory behavior conforms to the bare minimum 
“letter” of the contract as enforceable by a court of law, while consummate behavior goes 
beyond what the bare minimum of the contract requires and towards greater win-win gain.  
Perfunctory behavior means accepting greater individual gain, but an almost certainly 
smaller mutual payoff.  Consummate behavior means forgoing a large unilateral gain in 
exchange for a smaller individual payoff from a potentially larger mutual gain.  For example, 
the complete portion of a contract can specify the number of jokes a hired comedian must 
tell, but it is impractical to specify how funny she should be when she tells them.  A 
consummate comedian would strive for big laughs while a perfunctory comedian would 
settle for mild giggles.  The degree to which the payoffs and penalties from consummate 
and perfunctory behavior affect contract behavior increases the more the contract is 
incomplete and the greater the lock-in problems.  The goal of contract management is to 
develop and foster consummate behavior.  
Complex Contracting as a Prisoners’ Dilemma 
The strategic implications of the lock-in contracting problem resemble a prisoners’ 
dilemma.  While not all contracting relations end up as prisoners’ dilemma problems–buying 
simple products, for example, is likely to produce win-win outcomes–viewing complex 
contracting through the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) lens helps diagnose the problem – why the 
failure risk is so high for these contracts–and identify its solutions–how to manage these 
contracts to transform lose-lose conflict into win-win cooperation.  In a prisoners’ dilemma 
game, two (or more) players choose whether to cooperate or defect, with the payoff of their 
choices jointly determined.  If both choose to cooperate, each receives a moderately high 
payoff and if both choose to defect, each receives a moderately lower payoff.  If one elects 
to cooperate while the other defects, the defector receives a very high payoff and the 
cooperator a very low one.   
The buyer’s and seller’s complex contracting strategy options are analogous to 
prisoners’ dilemma strategies (see Table 1).  Perfunctory performance is analogous to 
defecting: it increases the performer’s payoff but by a smaller amount than the reduction in 
payoff for the other party.   Consummate behavior produces the higher mutual payoff for 
both, but risks the suckers payoff (a payoff of 1 in Table 1) if the other player elects to 
pursue perfunctory performance.  The size of the payoffs in Table 1 increases with the 





example, perfunctory seller behavior causes little harm when buying a simple commodity, 
like flour, and absent lock-in problems, troublesome sellers can easily be replaced with 
agreeable ones.  Our examples assume symmetrical payoffs for buyers and sellers.  In 
practice, one side’s advantages are likely to be greater, although the underlying logic of our 
theory holds so long as each side has some lock-in advantage over the other.    
Table 1. The Complex Contract Dilemma 
   
   
Buyer 
  Consummate Perfunctory 
Consummate 
 
3,  3 
S,  B 
 
1,  4 






4,  1 
S,  B 
 
2,  2 
S,   B 
Achieving win-win complex contracting outcomes requires changing the buyer’s and 
seller’s incentives from perfunctory behavior (defection) to consummate (cooperation) 
performance.  The challenge therefore is to change the payoff structure to another type of 
game (Lichbach, 1996).   First, the buyer and seller can seek credible commitments to 
cooperate, such as by submitting themselves to external supervision.  For example, 
perfunctory behavior may damage a firm’s reputation, making it a less attractive partner for 
future complex contracts.  Second, if both the buyer and seller care about the future and the 
PD game is played over multiple rounds, cooperation can be achieved through a “tit-for-tat 
strategy” in which both sides initially cooperate and then mirror the other party’s behavior 
from the previous round. 
The Impact of Nature 
While changing the payoff structure of the game increases the possibility of 
cooperation for complex contracting, external uncertainty, or ambiguity about the impact of 
future events or states (Heide & Miner, 1992), can undermine the prospects of cooperation, 
particularly in repeated play.  Summarizing the complex contracting game as a decision tree 
illustrates how the parties can achieve cooperation, but also how the uncertainty inherent in 
complex contracting can make cooperation more difficult.  Figure 1 depicts graphically the 
complex contracting game in tree form, with payoffs for cooperation and defection carried 
over from Figure 1, so that the payoffs for mutual cooperation are three each, for mutual 
defection two each, and in case of asymmetric strategies, one for the cooperator and four 





       
Phase I:  
Negotiation 
Phase II:                 
Strategy Selection 
Phase III:  
Nature 
Phase IV:     
Payoffs 
Phase IV:    
Payoffs 
 Buyer Seller  Buyer  Seller Net Gain 
   Positive 3 + 2 = 5 3 + 2 = 5 10 
  Cooperate     
   Negative 3 + 0 = 3 3 + 0 = 3 6 
 Cooperate      
   Positive 1 + 2 = 3 4 + 2 = 6 9 
  Defect     
   Negative 1 + 0 = 1 4 + 0 = 4 5 
Incomplete       
Contract       
   Positive 4 + 2 = 6 1 + 2 = 3 9 
  Cooperate     
   Negative 4 + 0 = 2 1 + 0 = 1 5 
 Defect      
   Positive 2 + 2 = 4 2 + 2 = 4 8 
  Defect     
   Negative 2 + 0 = 2 2 + 0 = 2 4 
The Complex Contracting Game 
The tree form represents complex contracting in stages.  In the first stage, the buyer 
and seller negotiate contract terms, leaving some portion incomplete, and each makes asset 
specific investments.  In the second phase, the players choose whether to cooperate or 
defect.  Next, nature changes circumstances.  As the contract is executed and the product is 
researched, developed and produced, nature reduces cost and value uncertainty by 
producing circumstances that affect the payoffs buyers and sellers receive.  However, 
buyers and sellers do not necessarily know how nature affected them or the other party: 
some portion of these changed circumstances is known to both parties and others are 
known only to one party or the other.  Perhaps the product was happily cheaper to produce 
for the seller and more valuable to the buyer than anticipated.  Or, perhaps the seller’s 
production costs were much higher and the product turned out to be less valuable to the 
buyer.   
Payoffs 
In the last stage, the payoffs are revealed to the buyer and seller, as determined by a 
combination of the parties’ strategies and the effect of nature.  For illustrative purposes, we 
adopt simplifying assumptions about the payoff distribution.  The complex contracting 
decision tree and payoffs can of course be expanded to include asymmetrical effects of 
nature and payoffs for cooperation and defection.  Figure 2 implicitly assumes nature 
equally advantaged and disadvantaged both the buyer and seller, with a plus two in case of 





lesson revealed in the tree form of the game is that the payoffs that buyers and sellers 
receive can depend as much on external circumstances as on their strategic choices about 
cooperation.  In Figure 1, for example, the seller receives the same payoff (three) under 
mutual cooperation with unfavorable circumstances as she receives under a suckers payoff 
(seller cooperates, buyer defects) with favorable circumstances.  If the buyer and seller do 
not know either the other party’s strategy or the whether circumstances were favorable, 
neither will know the extent to which the payoff was due to their strategic choice or the 
vagaries of natural fortune.  Moreover, without credible verification, neither side can reliably 
claim it was cooperating.   
Complex Contracting and the Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
Program 
In this section we present the Coast Guard’s Deepwater program to illustrate the 
challenges inherent in contracting for complex contracts.  The Deepwater program is an 
effort to upgrade and overhaul the Coast Guard’s “deepwater” air and sea vessels and the 
command and control links among them.4  In 1998, the Coast Guard issued a Request for 
Proposal to design a system of interoperable air and sea assets to meet its mission and 
performance goals while lowering total ownership costs.  The Coast Guard evaluated three 
industry proposals and selected a system design from Integrated Coast Guard Systems 
(ICGS, a consortium between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman).5  Under the ICGS 
proposal, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater assets would all be fully integrated in a state-of-the-
art command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance system, commonly referred to as C4ISR.  In June 2002, the Coast Guard 
awarded its first Deepwater contract to ICGS.   
The Deepwater case summary and analysis presented below are based on 
extensive qualitative research.  Our first data source is a thorough review of the vast public 
record on the program.  The General Accounting Office has written over a dozen reports on 
Deepwater (e.g., GAO, 2004, March; 2005, April; 2005, July; 2007, February; 2007, March; 
2007, June; 2008, March; 2008, June) and the Inspector General of the Department of 
Homeland Security reported on a major internal Deepwater investigation (Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2007).  Deepwater has been subject to 
several House and Senate committees hearings,6 Congressional Research Service 
Reports7 and other Deepwater reports from the Defense Acquisition University (2007) and 
Acquisition Solutions (2001).  The Deepwater program has also been reported fairly 
                                                
4 The term “deepwater” refers to Coast Guard assets that operate in literal deepwater, 50 miles off 
shore. 
5 ICGS’ proposal included five new sea vessels, two fixed-wing aircraft, two helicopters, and one 
unmanned aerial vehicle.  The other assets were upgrades.  
6 For examples, see the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and 
Global Terrorism, http://homeland.house.gov/Hearings/index.asp?ID=50 , and the Subcommittee on  
Coast Guard  and Maritime Transportation at 
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/File/Coast%20Guard/20070130/Opening20070130.pdf 






extensively in the news media, although we do not rely much on media reports for our 
primary case data.  
We have also conducted more than one hundred interviews with individuals 
knowledgeable about the case, including former and current Congressional committee staff 
members, current and former Coast Guard officials, officials from ICGS, officials from 
industry not associated with ICGS, officials from the Department of Homeland Security, 
academic experts on federal acquisition, and officials who serve in an advisory capacity to 
members of Congress.  A semi-structured interview protocol was used and all interviews 
were conducted by two, and in some cases three, researchers. The interview participants 
were guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity, and participation was completely voluntary 
with the option of withdrawing at any point. The project was approved by the institutional 
review boards at each of the author’s institutions. Interview notes were transcribed and 
coded, and the findings triangulated against other data sources.  
In the remainder of this section, we place the Deepwater contract in the complex 
contracting theoretical perspective.  Deepwater negotiations occurred in an environment of 
high uncertainty and lock-in fears that produced an incomplete contract.  The Coast Guard 
and ICGS both claimed to choose cooperative, consummate contracting strategies, although 
these claims are difficult to verify.  The Coast Guard and ICGS received lower than 
anticipated payoffs, however it is not clear whether this was the result of their contract 
strategies or an unexpectedly difficult contracting environment.  Our conclusions about the 
Deepwater processes and outcomes are drawn from our interviews and systematic analysis 
of the publicly available Deepwater information, and those documents received through the 
Freedom of Information process or provided by the interviewees.   
Background 
In recent history the Coast Guard’s procurement practice has been to separate 
purchases for individual classes of assets–ships, cutters, planes and helicopters; when a 
class of ships was no longer sea worthy, the Coast Guard bought a new one to replace it, 
perhaps with a modified design better suited to the Coast Guard’s evolving mission.  
Because it bought fewer and smaller assets relative to other major naval buyers–notably the 
US Navy–the Coast Guard largely made ad hoc purchases from a handful of small sellers 
(e.g., regional shipyards such as Bollinger).  By the early 1990s, it became clear that the 
Coast Guard needed a more targeted and strategic approach to upgrade its rapidly aging 
assets.8  Many Coast Guard assets were reaching the end of their usable life-span and were 
ill suited to the modern Coast Guard’s missions.  The Coast Guard leadership lobbied 
Congress for a long-term acquisition strategy that would upgrade and modernize a 
significant portion of the Coast Guard fleet with a stable funding stream.  In 1998, Congress 
and the Clinton administration committed to a multi-year procurement at approximately $500 
million a year, significantly more than the Coast Guard’s historical acquisition expenditures.9 
The result was the Deepwater program or Project Deepwater. 
                                                
8 As of 2001, 86% of the Coast Guard’s water and air assets had reached or were expected to reach 
the end of their planned service life within five years. The Coast Guard’s fleet of assets was widely 
considered to be one of the oldest in the world, ranking 37 out of 39 of the fleets worldwide 






Deepwater as a Complex Product 
The Deepwater program was a complex product.  The Coast Guard was highly 
uncertain about the value it would receive from Deepwater products.  The Coast Guard 
understood its objectives–maritime security (upholding the law), maritime safety (rescuing 
the distressed), protection of natural resources (protecting the environment), maritime 
mobility (ensuring safe marine transportation), and national defense (operating in 
coordination with the US Navy)–but it lacked information about the options for achieving 
them.  The Coast Guard knew the basic components that would ultimately comprise its 
asset fleet–small and large boats, planes, and helicopters, tied together through 
communication and integration technologies.  But the Coast Guard did not know what each 
of their performance specifications would be and how they would operate together in a 
system.  As a result, the Coast Guard was not well positioned to assess alternative system 
portfolios and system components. For example, how many fewer aircraft would be needed 
if the performance of the large cutters were increased twenty percent?  ICGS had cost 
uncertainty.  The Coast Guard had established a hard overall-cost cap ($500 million 
annually), but ICGS did not know how much it would cost to deliver these to meet the Coast 
Guard’s objectives.  Full cost information for each asset would not be available until the 
Coast Guard either specified performance standards with some precision or authorized a 
first-in-class design.10  Any delay in identifying these specifications would compound costs 
as production processes lay idle.   
Asset Specific Investments and Lock-In Risks 
The Deepwater assets vary in the degree to which they required asset specific 
investments.  On the low end of asset specificity are alterations to existing, highly 
marketable assets. For example, ICGS can turn to a variety of subcontractors to provide 
upgrades to helicopter engines. On the high end of asset specificity are new assets for 
which the Coast Guard is one of only a few potential buyers, if not the only buyer.  For 
example, one of the primary assets of the Deepwater program is the National Security 
Cutter (NSC), the largest class of ships in the Coast Guard fleet.  Northrop Grumman–the 
NSC lead contractor–developed a specialized production process for this asset because of 
the Coast Guard’s unique performance needs.  The Coast Guard also made investments 
that were to a degree asset specific, notably the creation of a Deepwater acquisition office, 
separate from its existing procurement infrastructure.  This unit was to design procurement 
practices and systems exclusively for ICGS; the Coast Guard staff needed special clearance 
to work on the Deepwater acquisition. As processes and staff become embedded with a 
single seller, it becomes harder to adapt to others. 
For both parties, these asset specific investments created lock-in risks. For the Coast 
Guard the risk was that ICGS would gain an information advantage as it designed and built 
the assets.  If ICGS elected to abuse its information advantage (e.g., by “gold plating” the 
product), the Coast Guard would have limited options for alternatives.  For example, a highly 
                                                
10 First-in-class designs typically encounter cost overruns and schedule delays as the buyer and seller 
work out the precise specifications for the product. Cost-plus contracts are often used for the 
prototype design where the buyer bears greater cost risk.  This puts the burden on the buyer to 
determine what it is exactly that they want to buy.  Once the first-in-class asset is completed, parties 






asset specific element of ICGS’ Deepwater system is the logistics and communication 
systems for integrating all the system components, known as C4ISR.11  ICGS has 
substantial research, development, modification and adaption costs invested in tailoring this 
system to the Coast Guard’s needs.  In order to secure a return on its investment, ICGS has 
a strong incentive to make this system as proprietary as possible. As such, the Coast Guard 
now has to largely rely on ICGS for costly capability enhancements, training, technical 
assistance, and standard operational maintenance and upgrades.  For ICGS, the primary 
lock-in risk is that it may not recoup its investments (i.e. research and development and 
production) if the Coast Guard elects to stop buying those system elements for which ICGS 
has made asset specific investments.  If the Coast Guard elected to buy helicopter engine 
upgrades from an alternative supplier, ICGS can tender its engines to another buyer–the 
market is thick.  The risk is for highly asset-specific elements like the C4ISR system 
developed for the Coast Guard.12  
Incomplete Contracts 
One can imagine that in designing and producing an aerial or sea vessel, let alone 
an interoperable system of such assets, there is an almost infinite set of product 
specifications over which the buyer and seller might negotiate (e.g., the speed and lift of 
helicopters, the time at sea for boats, crew capacity, etc.).  To fully specify many of these 
decisions requires forecasting an array of variable future conditions (i.e., states of nature), 
some of which are highly unpredictable (e.g., weather, terrorists, drug runners). Given the 
value uncertainty faced by the Coast Guard, the cost uncertainty faced by ICGS, and the 
mutual risk of lock-in, the two parties entered into a contract arrangement that specified 
some aspects of the system, but left others unspecified.   
The Coast Guard and ICGS sought to balance their need for specificity against the 
uncertainty inherent in buying a complex product by specifying three contract layers.  The 
top layer was a performance-based indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract.  In 
the simplest terms, an IDIQ does not specify a firm quantity of products or the tasks required 
to produce them, but rather specifies a minimum or maximum number of products and some 
end-point for termination of the agreement.13  The Deepwater IDIQ contract specified that 
the Coast Guard could buy a set of system components without competitively bidding each 
one; instead each purchase was only with ICGS.  In a sense, the IDIQ acts like a menu with 
the base costs for various items, but where the add-ons are neither specified nor priced.  
The middle layer of the contract set the broad terms of exchange.  Each purchase 
under the IDIQ was negotiated through a task order between the Coast Guard and ICGS 
that specified basic terms, such as the number of units to be purchased in a class of assets 
                                                
11 Lockheed Martin assumed the lead in development and production of this element because of its 
experience with the Navy’s AEGIS system (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_combat_system).  This 
is a legacy system which is the first generation predecessor to a more modern Coast Guard C4ISR 
system. 
12 Interestingly, there is significant interest from overseas buyers for the C4ISR system, but because 
of national security concerns ICGS is prohibited from selling comparable systems abroad. 






and their delivery schedule, but left many dimensions indeterminate, like the exact design 
and performance specifications, cost schedules, and the evaluation metrics.   
Specifying many of the details of each task order occurred through a final contract 
layer that was intended to facilitate less formalized cooperation through the process of 
designing, testing, and building the asset.  This process occurred through Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs).  The IPTs were designed as collaborative governance mechanisms 
that brought together ICGS personnel, subcontractors, and Coast Guard officials to decide 
the important details about the asset under their jurisdiction.  However, once production was 
underway, rather than fully renegotiate each task order to reflect some design change or 
refinement, the Coast Guard and ICGS used Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs).   UCAs 
are a legal vehicle that allows production to continue after a design change, even though the 
parties had not formally negotiated the full price and terms of that change.  UCAs require 
that the parties formally resolve the specification and price within 180 days.  UCAs place the 
cost risk on the buyer because the seller has considerable discretion over the price charged 
for each revision.  Once these items become definitized they operate like fixed cost 
contracts.   
These three contractual layers specified the terms of the exchange and established a 
process for the Coast Guard and ICGS to reduce value and cost uncertainty, although they 
still did not fully specify the contract.  The task orders and UCAs could not specify every 
design and performance requirement for each asset and how they would fit together.  Part of 
the specification challenge was the interoperability requirement–and hence 
interconnectedness–of the system.  Any performance specification (e.g., the speed of a 
boat) had implications for other system elements (e.g., the range of helicopters and planes).  
Because the acquisition of the total Deepwater fleet was sequenced over a twenty-five year 
period, the Coast Guard and ICGS were unable to forecast (and specify formally in a task 
order) every detail of the assets early in the acquisition because these would then cement 
performance specifications for all later assets, which had not yet been specified or fully 
designed in some cases. Furthermore, because so much about these assets would not be 
known until the first unit was built, tested and refined in operating conditions, experience 
was perhaps the best guide for specifying much of the performance terms.  Many of these 
elements would need to be resolved either informally by ICGS and the Coast Guard working 
together or by one or the other of the parties deciding unilaterally.  As a result, the 
incompleteness of the contractual arrangements left substantial room for the behavior, or 
strategy, of both the Coast Guard and ICGS to impact outcomes. 
Strategy 
At the outset of the contract, ICGS and Coast Guard pledged to pursue 
consummate, cooperative strategies for how they treated the contract, often invoking 
“partnership” language to describe the relationship they were entering.  Harkening back to 
our theoretical terms, a partnership implies that each party was prepared to forgo an 
advantage for itself in favor of a larger benefit for the other side.  Perfunctory behavior, on 
the other hand, means following the “letter” of the contract and perhaps engaging in 
opportunistic behavior to pursue unilateral gain at the expense of greater mutual gain.  With 
so much of the Deepwater contract incomplete, much of the contract’s payoff would be 
determined by the parties’ behavior.  
Here we focus on one of the first task orders–the delivery of the NSC–to illustrate the 





degree of asset specificity described earlier.  The task order was incomplete in that it left 
many performance requirements indeterminate, following the pattern of devolving these 
decisions to an IPT and later definitization.14  In addition, the task order was incomplete in 
that it did not identify the decision making rights and obligations of either ICGS or the Coast 
Guard over these unspecified elements. Specifically, the task order did not identify: which 
party had decision making authority over structural design specifications; the conditions 
under which independent third-party assessment of the design would be necessary, or 
which organizations would be qualified to perform this role (e.g., US Navy’s Surface Warfare 
Division); corrective action or sanctions in the event that design specifications were not 
certifiable; criteria and evaluation process for paying award fees; and penalties or 
accommodations for cost overruns or missed delivery dates. This left both parties with a 
wide berth to behave consummately or perfunctorily.  
In these areas, ICGS had discretion to openly discuss and jointly agree with the 
Coast Guard on the remaining unspecified decisions for the final design of the NSC.  Such 
an approach would be consummate behavior because it would produce win-win outcomes 
for the Coast Guard and ICGS.  Alternatively, the contract allowed ICGS to specify design 
standards unilaterally).  Such an approach would be perfunctory behavior because, although 
it was easier for ICGS to decide standards on its own, Coast Guard bore the risk of buying 
assets whose performance abilities did not meet what it needed.  If ICGS chose 
consummate behavior, it would use the IPT to jointly discuss and develop design and 
performance standards that aligned with the Coast Guard’s goals for the cutter (e.g., that it 
be capable of being at sea for 230 days a year with a 30-year service life). ICGS would 
explain to the Coast Guard the value and cost tradeoffs associated with different design and 
performance standard modifications.15 Placing this discussion within the IPT might also 
provide ICGS with the perspectives of both Coast Guard technical and operational experts 
along with third party experts, such as those from the American Bureau of Shipping.   
This cooperative approach through the IPTs would increase ICGS’s costs because 
orchestrating an open conversation with the Coast Guard about the comparative pros and 
cons of alternative design specifications would require significant investment of staff and 
time.16 There would also be no guarantee that the investment would benefits ICGS more 
than these costs, in large part because ICGS would have to keep production processes idle 
while it waited for Coast Guard officials to decide each unspecified item.  However, 
supplying more complete information would provide more value to the Coast Guard than it 
would cost ICGS to perform because the Coast Guard would be more likely to receive an 
                                                
14 The design of the NSC has occurred in two phases. In the Phase 1 RFP, 85% of the design criteria 
and performance standards had been developed by the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of 
Shipping. In the second phase, the contract, ICGS had discretion over what the remaining criteria and 
standards were going to be. However, the Coast Guard did not include a contractual mechanism that 
would ensure that the alternative standards would be consistent with the standards developed in the 
Phase 1 RFP. (http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/OIGtm_RLS_051707.pdf). 
15 For example, these discussions might include an explanation on the part of ICGS would clearly 
articulate that an additional investment of X dollars would yield an increase in Y days at sea or 
conversely that accepting some alternative would lead to a Z percent decline in days at sea, but 
potentially lower costs by X dollars or increase the lifespan of the cutter by Y years. 
16 This would require conducting simulations and cost-benefit modeling to determine the relative pros 
and cons associated with each design alternative, coordinating participation from all the IPT 





asset–the NSC in this case–better aligned with mission requirements. Conversely, ICGS 
could spend little on providing information to the Coast Guard, or simply make decisions 
itself, which would be less costly.  However, because the Coast Guard would receive a 
product that might not meet its performance requirements, it would then be forced to pay 
even more to modify the asset.  Such changes would likely cost more for the Coast Guard 
than they could have cost ICGS (and the Coast Guard) to negotiate in advance through the 
IPTs if ICGS had been pursuing a consummate approach to the contract.    
Just as ICGS could pursue a consummate or perfunctory approach to the contract, 
the Coast Guard faced a similar decision.  The Coast guard could reduce ICGS’ costs by 
inviting ICGS to provide comparative information on alternative performance specifications 
and quickly responding with decisions.  Such an approach would be consummate behavior. 
Alternatively, the Coast Guard could eschew opportunities to collaborate with ICGS to 
determine the design standards in the IPT, and instead unilaterally process UCAs, which 
would be perfunctory behavior.  Choosing consummate behavior would mean the Coast 
Guard would actively participate in the IPT by suggesting ways the proposed assets might 
be designed or modified to fulfill mission requirements before production moved too far 
along.  Such behavior would increase Coast Guard’s costs because it would require 
collecting relevant performance requirements and translating it for ICGS. This action would 
produce less value for the Coast Guard because, in the absence of a contractual 
requirement that ICGS provide comparative information (recall that these obligations were 
not specified in the contract), ICGS may not respond to the request.  However, such efforts 
to specify performance requirements would provide more value for ICGS because it would 
both produce a satisfied customer more inclined to renew existing and process new task 
orders and lower the costs of designing and producing subsequent interoperable assets.17  
Conversely, if the Coast Guard chose perfunctory behavior, it would save the cost of 
acquiring performance requirement information needed to specify incomplete design 
standards.   However, ICGS’s costs would increase by more than the Coast Guard’s saving 
because ICGS would either have to devote its own resources to gather the information 
(which would likely cost more than if the Coast Guard did this itself) or increase the risk of 
the Coast Guard not renewing the contract. 
Taken together, ICGS and Coast Guard found themselves on the horns of a 
collective- action problem in resolving the incomplete terms of the contract.  Both the Coast 
Guard and ICGS would be the best off if each behaved consummately.  The costs of 
cooperation–namely additional resources devoted to reducing the other party’s value or cost 
uncertainty–would be high for each, but these costs would be less than the mutual gain–a 
highly satisfied Coast Guard enjoying a NSC that met its mission requirements and a likely 
continuation of the IDIQ contract and subsequent task orders for ICGS.  However, the 
benefits of mutual cooperation were jeopardized by the risk of the other player’s possible 
defection.  The Coast Guard and ICGS risked losing their investments if the other party 
opted not to reciprocate (i.e., the sucker’s payoff).  If the Coast Guard behaved 
consummately and ICGS perfunctorily, the Coast Guard would receive an NSC that met 
basic contractual requirements (i.e., adhered to the “letter” of the contract) but failed to meet 
expectations in areas not specified in the contract, with the ICGS still receiving its full 
payment.  If ICGS behaved consummately and the Coast Guard perfunctorily, ICGS would 
have spent effort to meet its best guess of the Coast Guard’s mission requirements but may 
                                                
17 Once ICGS knows all the design specifications for the NSC, it knows many of the specifications for 





have still missed the mark, thereby subjecting itself to the risk of not receiving full payment 
and putting future task orders at risk.  Finally, if both parties behaved perfunctorily by 
avoiding costly collaboration in the IPT, the result would be an NSC that failed to meet 
Coast Guard’s needs and jeopardized future IDIQ and task orders. 
Nature and Outcomes 
On May 8, 2008, ICGS delivered the first-in-class NSC–the Bertholf–255 days 18after 
the projected delivery date and over double the projected cost baseline.19 Preliminary 
testing of the Bertholf revealed 2800 issues (trial cards) to be addressed, but only eight 
issues (starred trial cards) which required addressing before acceptance.20  The boat proved 
sea worthy and met most contractually specified performance requirements; the Coast 
Guard accepted delivery.   
Both sides received less than they anticipated and are generally unhappy with 
contract outcomes.  Performance evaluation of both parties by each other and external 
parties and overseers has questioned a range of leadership actions, decisions, and cast 
blame on each for the cost overruns, quality deficiencies, and schedule delays (GAO, 2008, 
March; 2008, June; 2007, February; 2007, March; 2005, April; 2005, July; 2004; CRS, 2008; 
DHS OIG, 2007; DAU 2007).  The Coast Guard faced program delays, higher costs, and 
was criticized for accepting a flawed asset design. ICGS saw Congressional scrutiny, 
reputational damage, and lost task orders under the initial IDIQ. 
Our framing of the Deepwater contract as a prisoner’s dilemma suggests a possible 
explanation for these outcomes is that both the Coast Guard and ICGS behaved 
perfunctorily.    The Coast Guard has been criticized for not actively participating in the NSC 
IPT, ceding decision authority over many unspecified design elements to ICGS, and 
unilaterally changing some NSC specifications through UCAs and then failing to definitize 
(GAO, 2008, June).  ICGS has been criticized for not providing the Coast Guard sufficient 
information about the NSC’s value-cost tradeoffs, over-billing the Coast Guard for 
modifications and alterations, and in some cases improperly exercising independent 
decision authority in the IPT by specifying design standards without sufficient Coast Guard 
input (DHS OIG, 2007; GAO, 2008, June; 2007, February; 2007, March; 2007, June).  
Recall that one of the implications of our complex contracting theory is that it is 
particularly difficult to sort out the independent impact of strategy and nature on outcomes.  
A negative turn of events outside the control of each party, for example, may make the 
outcomes of even a cooperative contract appear substandard.  In the case of the NSC, 
unpredicted external events may have contributed to outcomes and thus masked what might 
have been cooperative, consummate contracting practices.  First, the terrorist attacks of 9-
                                                
18 “The Deepwater contract originally called for production and deployment work for NSC1 to be 
completed on August 3, 2007 with final delivery to the Coast Guard scheduled for August 27, 2007” 
(page 7 of http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-23_Jan07.pdf ). The Coast Guard 
reports taking delivery of the first NSC on May 8, 2008 
(http://www.uscg.mil/acquisition/nsc/default.asp). This represents a 255-day delay. 
19 The original contract estimate for the NSC was valued at $322.2 million. Modifications and 
alterations in the design lead to $291.2 million in increased costs plus $35 million for inflation 






11 (which hit in the midst of the NSC’s design and production) spurred the assignment of 
Coast Guard to the newly created Department of Homeland Security and expanded its 
mission responsibilities. Coast Guard’s enhanced mission prompted significant changes to 
the NSC, notably an increase in its size and capabilities. Given the speed of events and 
Coast Guard’s desire not to derail the production of the NSC, Coast Guard made these 
decisions unilaterally.  ICGS, perhaps interpreting the receipt of major changes to an agreed 
upon design as perfunctory behavior, did not invest in explaining the cost implications of 
these changes to Coast Guard.  A second unforeseen event was Hurricane Katrina, which 
struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, damaging Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in 
Pascagoula, Mississippi where the NSCs were being constructed.  The damage delayed 
delivery and increased production costs.   As ICGS felt that the calamity was not its fault, it 
passed some cost increase to the Coast Guard.   At the time of billing, ICGS submitted a 
Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA), which included modifications to meet the 9-11 
mission changes and costs associated with Hurricane Katrina. 
Although the exact impact of these unforeseen events remains unknown, Coast 
Guard and ICGS believe the other’s perfunctory behavior is largely to blame for the NSC’s 
outcomes.  In the most recent task order contracts, Coast Guard and ICGS clearly adopted 
perfunctory strategies that meet the letter of the contract, without the spirit of cooperation.  
The pretense of collaboration has been abandoned as the Coast Guard has set up its own 
acquisition directorate, assumed an increasing number of the responsibilities delegated to 
ICGS under the original IDIQ contract, is exercising greater authority over decision making 
(in and out of the IPTs), and is seeking to  buy assets outside the IDIQ with ICGS. The 
promise of a win-win “partnership” has deteriorated into a lose-lose transaction as each 
party pursues a perfunctory strategy. 
Conclusion 
The theory of complex contracting and the illustration of the Coast Guard’s Project 
Deepwater presented suggest that complex contracting is risky.  Complex contracts are 
highly uncertain, costly to negotiate and execute, and obfuscate accountability. Under the 
prisoners’ dilemma, lose-lose defection is individually more attractive than win-win 
cooperation, despite cooperation’s higher mutual gains.  Uncertainty about nature’s 
contributions to payoffs mean even the contract parties do not know whether contract 
outcomes stem from misfortune, the other party’s malfeasance, or their own 
mismanagement. In the case of Deepwater, both Coast Guard and ICGS assumed the other 
“defected.”  Overseers, notably Congressional oversight committees, have pushed the 
Coast Guard towards a perfunctory contracting approach.  As our analysis shows, however, 
while some evidence suggests that one or both of the exchange parties are partially at fault, 
nature may have produced negative outcomes and pushed the parties towards a lose-lose 
outcome.  In moving forward, the default response should not necessarily be to position 
Coast Guard and whatever sellers it engages into a rigidly perfunctory posture.   
Because complex contracts are prone to renegotiation, the “shadow of the future” 
opens a wealth of cooperative strategies to foster norms of reciprocity and trust and thus 
allow contract parties to turn lose-lose conflict into win-win cooperation (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; 
Heide & Miner, 1992). Moreover, these cooperative strategies enhance overseer’s ability to 
hold the exchange parties accountable in the contract process.  In the case of Deepwater, 
the multi-stage architecture of the contracting process allows for this kind of renegotiation.  
While the projection is that it will take 25 years to deliver all the component Deepwater 





Instead the IDIQ contract is structured in five-year increments.  The asset-specific nature of 
the some of the system components means that the Coast Guard faces a thin market of 
alternative suppliers for some assets, but at a minimum the overall contract arrangement 
allows for both exit and renegotiation.   
The shadow of the future shapes whether parties spiral away from partnership 
towards a more formalized and perhaps antagonistic relationship.  Congress’ increasing 
oversight and involvement in the Deepwater program demonstrate how political actors can 
change the rules of the game.  At present, Congress is pushing the Coast Guard towards a 
non-cooperative approach and away from a cooperative stance.  Congress could instead 
foster cooperation, for example, rather than forcing the Coast Guard to move away from an 
integrated relationship with ICGS to a more differentiated purchasing arrangement, 
Congress could encourage the Coast Guard to build on recent efforts to enhance the Coast 
Guard’s role in the IPTs and rely more extensively on third-party certification of product 
design and delivery.  A primary justification for such an approach is that there are significant 
opportunities to capture knowledge and information from the first round and apply it to 
subsequent rounds of contracting.  The practice of complex contracting need not be so dire.
References 
Acquisition Solutions. (2001, July 14). Independent assessment of the United States Coast 
Guard integrated deepwater system acquisition. Issue Brief. Arlington, VA: Author. 
Akerloff, G. (1970). The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488. 
Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.  
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2001). Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement 
contracts. Rand Journal of Economics, 32(3), 387-407. 
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (1999, March 15). Procurement contracts: Fixed price vs. cost plus. 
Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=156470  
Brown, T.L., Potoski, M., & Van Slyke, D.M. (2006). Managing public service contracts: 
Aligning values, institutions, and markets. Public Administration Review, 66(3), 53-
67.  
Cooper, P. (2003). Governing by contract: Challenges and opportunities for public 
managers. Washington DC: CQ Press. 
David, P.A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. The American Economic Review, 
75(2), 332-337. 
DAU. (2007, February). Quick look study: United States Coast Guard Deepwater Program. 
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. (2007, January). Acquisition 
of the national security cutter: US Coast Guard (OIG-07-23). Washington, DC: US 
GPO. 
GAO. (2004, March 9). Contract management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater program needs 
increased attention to management and contractor oversight (GAO-04-380). 
Washington, DC: Author.  
GAO. (2005, April 20). Coast Guard: Preliminary observations on the condition of 
Deepwater legacy assets and acquisition management challenges (GAO-05-307T). 
Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2005, July 22). Coast Guard: Progress being made on addressing Deepwater legacy 
asset condition issues and program management, but acquisition challenges remain 





GAO. (2007, February 15). Coast Guard: Preliminary observations on Deepwater program 
assets and management challenges (GAO-07-446T). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2007, March 8). Coast Guard: Status of efforts to improve deepwater program 
management an address operational challenges (GAO-07-575T). 
GAO. (2007, June). Coast Guard: Challenges affecting Deepwater asset deployment and 
management and efforts to address them (GAO-07-874). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2008, March 5). Coast Guard: Deepwater program management initiatives and key 
Homeland Security missions (GAO-08-531T). Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2008, June). Coast Guard: Changes in course improves Deepwater management 
and oversight, but outcome still uncertain (GAO-08-745). Washington, DC: Author. 
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (2008). Contracts as reference points. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 123(1), 1-48.  
Heide, J., & Miner, A. (1992). The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction 
and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation. Academy of Management 
Journal, 35(3), 265-291. 
Heinrich, C.J. (1999). Do government bureaucrats make effective use of performance 
management information? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
9(3), 363-394. 
Kelman, S.J. (2002). Contracting. In S.M. Lester (Ed.), The tools of government: A guide to 
the new governance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Kettl, D. (1993). Sharing power: Public governance and private markets. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution. 
Lichbach, M.I. (1996). The cooperator’s dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press. 
Martin, L.L. (2004). Performance-based contracting for human services: Does it work? 
Administration in Social Work, 29(1), 63–77. 
Milward, H.B., & Provan, K.G. (2000). Governing the hollow state.  Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 10, 359-80. 
O’Looney, J.A. (1998). Outsourcing state and local government services: Decision-making 
strategies and management methods. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. 
O’Rourke, R. (2008, June 5). Coast Guard Deepwater acquisition programs: Background, 
oversight issues, and options for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report 
for Congress. Washington, DC: US GPO. 
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158. 
Sclar, E.D. (2000). You don’t always get what you pay for: The economics of privatization. 
Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press. 
Smith, S.R., & Lipsky, M. (1993). Non-profits for hire: The welfare state in the age of 
contracting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Tirole, Jean. (1999). Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand. Econometrica, 76(4): 741-
781. 
Weimer, D., & Vining, A. (1999). Policy analysis: Concepts and practice. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Williamson, O. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications: A study 
in the economics of internal organization. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, O. (2005). The economics of governance. American Economic Association 























2003 - 2010 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 





 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition Budgeting 
Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 





 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our website: 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
